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Lauer: Lauer: Sales Warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code

SALES WARRANTIES UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
T. E. LAUER*
According to Williston, there is in the language of the law no more
troublesome word than "warranty."' As applied to sales law, the meaning
of "warranty" has varied from (1) an undertaking contemporaneous with,
but collateral to, the contract of sale, to (2) an integral part of the sales
contract itself. Thus in 1884 we find Biddle describing a warranty as
an express or implied statement of something with respect to
the article sold which the seller undertakes shall be part of a
contract of sale; and though part of the contract, yet collateral
to the express object of it.2
The view of the sales contract thus expressed is that fundamentally the
contract serves merely to pass title to goods from the seller to the buyer,
and consequently any other matters are "collateral."
Seventy years later essentially the same definition appears in Corpus
J uris Secundum, and in 1960 the latter was quoted approvingly by the
St. Louis Court of Appeals. 4 Nor was this concept of warranty without
effect; it led the English in section 62 of the Sale of Goods Act to provide
that where a warranty is breached, the buyer may not return the goods,
but may only seek redress in an action for damages.5 Breach of warranty,
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. 1 WILLIsToN, SALES § 181 (3d ed. 1948).
2.

BIDDLE, WARRANTIES IN THE SALE OF CHATrELS 1

(1884). See also VoLD,

SALES § 85 (3d ed. 1959).

3. 77 C.J.S.Sale.r § 301 (1954).
4. Mitchell v. Rudasill, 332 S.W.2d 91, 94-95 (St.
5. SALE OF GooDs AcT, 1894, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71:

L. Mo. App. 1960).

"Warranty" as regards England and Ireland means an agreement with
reference to goods which are the subject of a contract of sale, but collateral
to the main purpose of such contract, the breach of which gives rise to
the claim for damages, but not to a right to reject the goods and treat the

contract as repudiated.
The provision as to Scotland clearly is in recognition of that country's civil law
background. To the extent to which we have come to recognize warranties as an
integral, essential part of the sale contract, we have adopted the civil law view of
this device. Thus Domat in 1694 describes the engagements of the seller to the
buyer as being of four types: (1) to deliver the thing sold, (2) to care for it be(259)
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in other words, was not sufficiently close to the core of the sale contract
to permit the buyer to reject the goods and revest title in the seller.
The modern American view of warranties, on the other hand, as
embodied in the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code,
is that they are central to the sale contract, being an incidental and integral
part thereof. As stated in the Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, "the whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what
it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell.""
Missouri did not adopt the Uniform Sales Act, and has never, prior
to 1965, codified its sales law. Accordingly, before the adoption of the
UCC, there are no Missouri statutes relating to sales warranties, and warranty law has been entirely court-made. Nevertheless, since the Englisk
Sale of Goods Act and the Uniform Sales Act were largely codifications
of the common law, the Missouri law of warranties has been generally
similar to that of the other states. And to the extent that the Sales Article
of the UCC incorporates the provisions of the English act and the Uniform
Sales Act, the new Code will not make sweeping changes in Missouri
warranty law. In a number of respects, however, the UCC does bring about
modifications and refinements, and there are one or two areas of substantial
reform.
Basically, under the UCC as under prior law, sales warranties fall into
three categories: express warranties, warranties of title, and implied warranties of quality. A word as to the nature of each is in order.
Express warranties are statements or promises relating to the goods,
made by the seller to induce the sale thereof, and which are acted upon
by the buyer to the extent that the sale is consummated.
The warranty of title relates to the nature of the seller's interest in
the thing sold; the buyer normally believes that the seller has a good
title to the goods, without encumbrances, and is free to sell them. This
expectation is recognized and enforced by the warranty of title, which is
imposed by law upon the sale contract.
fore delivery, (3) to protect the -buyer against the claims of others, and (4)
relating "to the faults of the thing sold." As to the latter, Domat says:
Since people buy things only to employ them to the uses for which
they are destined, this is a fourth engagement which the seller is under
to the buyer, to take back the thing sold, if it has such faults and defects
as render it unfit for use, or too troublesome, or to diminish the price of the
thing; whether the defects were known to the seller or not. And if he
knows them, he is obliged to declare them.
1 DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAw IN ITs NATuRAL ORDER 198-99 (Strahan transl. 1850).
6. Comment 4 to UCC § 2-313 (1962).
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Implied warranties are obligations relating to the quality and nature
of the goods which the law imposes upon the seller in a sale contract. Are
the goods suitable for the purposes for which such goods are ordinarily
used; are they equal in quality to other, similar goods available in the marketplace; will they perform any special functions made known to the
seller, and upon whose choice of goods for such purpose the buyer relies?
This implied warranty of quality may arise in part from the legitimate
expectations of the parties, but perhaps in greater part it arises from the
public policy to protect buyers from goods of inferior or harmful quality.
These sales warranties have long been recognized in principle by
the Missouri courts, and they are given force and effect by the UCC.
Seven sections of the Code relate specifically to sales warranties, sections
400.2-312 through 400.2-318. These sections deal with the nature, creation and interpretation of warranties as well as with the persons they
affect and how in a given sale they may be excluded or modified.
I. ExPREss

WARRANTIES:

400.2-313

A. Nature of Express Warranty

In a sales transaction, 7 an express warranty arises from a promise
or affirmation of fact made by the seller to the buyer to induce the
purchase of the goods. The Missouri courts have recognized express warranties in sales contracts, and have described them in this fashion.,
Section 400.2-313(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted
in Missouri generally restates what has long been the law of this state,
but with some refinement. The section provides that an express warranty
arises in a sales contract when any of the following is made "part of
the basis of the bargain": (a) an affirmation or promise by the seller
which relates to the goods; (b) a description of the goods; (c) a sample
or model of the goods,
The precise meaning of "part of the basis of the bargain" is not set
forth in the Code. Apparently whether a particular statement, description
or sample is a part of the basis of the bargain will depend upon the
7. Express warranties are not limited to sales contracts. See, e.g., Stone v.
Farmington Aviation Corp., 363 Mo. 803, 253 S.W.2d 810 (1953), involving an
express warranty allegedly made by the lessor of an airplane when he said to the
lessee, "It is all ready to go; it is in good shape."
8. Charles F. Curry & Co. v. Hedrick, 378 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1964); Turner
v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d 603 (1945).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [1965], Art. 6

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

facts of the particular case. Some guidance is furnished by the Official
Comment: "The sole question is whether the language or samples or models
are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract."
One substantial change relating to the creation of express warranties
has been brought about by the Code. Express warranties being contractual,
the Missouri courts have required them to be supported by consideration. Of course an express warranty made at the time of contracting is
amply supported by the consideration relating to the contract itself, principally by the buyer's promise or payment of the purchase price. However,
it has been held that statements or representations made by the seller
after the sale, "being without consideration, could not be invoked or
relied upon as obligations of warranty."' 0
The Uniform Commercial Code, in section 400.2-209(1), provides
that "An agreement modifying a contract within this article needs no
consideration to be binding.' Accordingly, under the Code, absence of
consideration is no bar to the making of an express warranty after the
agreement has been entered into, provided of course that the language
can be said to be "part of the basis of the bargain! ' B. Affirmation or Promise
Section 400.2-313(1)(a) provides that an express -warranty is created by an affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain.
Where such a warranty is made, the goods must conform to the affirmation
or promise.
Express warranties of this nature normally arise from negotiation
or "dickering" in the bargaining process relating to a particular sale.
Generally these warranties serve to identify with greater precision the
nature and quality of the goods the seller seeks to sell.
The Missouri courts have recognized, for example, that an express
warranty may arise from a seller's statement that fatena, a hog feed,
was "a whole and complete feed,"' 2 or that a particular jack is a "good
performer and sure breeder."' 2 In addition, express warranties may arise
outside of the area of negotiation, as where the seller makes statements
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Comment 7 to UCC § 2-313 (1962).
Dotson v. International Harvester Co., 285 S.W.2d 585, 591 (Mo. 1955).
See Comment 7 to UCC § 2-313 (1962).
Ralston Purina Co. v. Swaithes, 142 S.W.2d 340 (K.C. Mo. App. 1940).
Burns v. Limerick, 178 Mo. App. 145, 165 S.W. 1166 (K.C. Ct. App. 1914).
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in a newspaper advertisement 4 or on the product label. 15 Presumably the
Code would not modify these holdings.
C. Description of the Goods
Where a description of the goods is made part of the basis of the
bargain, section 400.313(1)(b) provides that an express warranty is created that the goods shall conform to the description. Denominating the
warranty of description as an express warranty represents a departure
from the Uniform Sales Act, which provided that the warranty of description is implied.16 The reason for this modification, no doubt, is that
in many cases it is impossible to distinguish between an affirmation
of fact relating to the goods and a description of the goods;1? this has caused
serious problems relating to interpretation and disclaimer.
The Missouri decisions are in accord with the UCC, except that they
have characterized the warranty of description as implied rather than
express. Thus as early as 1884 the St. Louis Court of Appeals said:
[T]he sale of an article which the buyer has not seen, by a specific description whose meaning is a matter of common understanding, and known to the parties, always implies a guaranty that the
article, when delivered, shall be of the particular description. This
guaranty has no reference to either quality or value, and depends
upon no warranty of either. It is as if A should sell a horse to
B, and deliver a cow instead. It would not help A's breach of con14. DeGouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d
336 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936). Here the advertisement was rejected as a warranty,
because the buyer saw it only after purchasing the goods. Whether such a subsequent advertisement could be of any effect under the UCC is not entirely clear.
Assume, for example, a case in which the buyer purchases animal feed, intending
to supplement it with vitamins, minerals and other ingredients. The seller then
places an advertisement that the feed is a "complete food," with the result that
the 'buyer sees the statement and abandons the supplement, feeding only the
purchased feed. The animals suffer from malnutrition as a result thereof. Has the
buyer a cause of action under the Code for breach of express warranty?
15. Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d
532 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952); DeGouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., supra note 14.
16. UNIFORM SALES Acr § 14.
17. Consider, for example, Childs v. Emerson, 117 Mo. App. 671, 93 S.W.
286 (St. L. Ct. App. 1906), where the seller offered to sell a jack 15% hands
high, weighing 1000 pounds. Was this an affirmation of fact or a description relating to the goods? The court held that because the parties were dealing with a
specifc animal, the warranty was express, rather than the implied warranty of
description. On the other hand, where the goods are of a fungible nature, the warranty has been said to be implied. Long Bros. v. J. K. Armsby Co., 43 Mo. App.
253 (K.C. Ct. App. 1891) ("strictly choice evaporated apples," the same being a
mercantile grade).
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tract, to set up that the cow was worth as much as the horse, or
that there was no warranty of value.'
Again, as recently as 1959, the existence of the warranty of description
has been reaffirmed in a case where a farmer ordered sargo seed but milo
seed was delivered.19
D. Sample or Model
Section 400.2-313(1)(c) provides that where a sample or model is
made a part of the basis of the bargain, an express warranty arises that
the goods shall conform to the sample or model. Thus, where a sample
of the goods to be sold is drawn from bulk, or the seller exhibits a
model of the goods, the buyer may bargain upon the basis that the goods
sold will conform to the sample or model. The same result would follow
where the buyer furnished the sample or model, and the bargain was
sealed with reference thereto. In this sense, the word "sample" apparently
refers to existing fungible goods, being drawn from bulk, and "model" to
goods to be manufactured.
Missouri decisions recognize the creation of a warranty in a sale
by sample or model, but characterize it as an implied, rather than an express, warranty, as did the Uniform Sales Act. 20 Thus, the warranty has
22
21
been held to exist where there was a sale by sample of oranges, wool,
and secondhand bags.23 Likewise where a model of a turkey caller was
exhibited by the seller, it was said that "the law implies a warranty on
2
his part to make them according to the sample.'1 1
E. Creation of Express Warranty
Section 400.2-313(2) specifies that to create an express warranty,
it is not necessary for the seller to use words such as "warrant!' or "guarantee." This has been recognized in this state since at least as early
as 1870, when the Missouri Supreme Court said:
18. Catchings v. Hacke, 15 Mo. App. 51, 53-54 (St. L. Ct. App. 1884). This

case dealt with the sale of "No. 2 white mixed corn," as did Whittaker v. Mc-

Cormack, 6 Mo. App. 114 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878).
19. Blackburn v. Carlson Seed Co., 321 S.W.2d 520 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959).
20. UNiFoRm SALES Acr § 16.
21. Graff v. Foster, 67 Mo. 512 (1878).
22. Voss v. McGuire, 18 Mo. App. 477 (K.C. Ct. App. 1885).
23. Levine Bag Co. v. Minneapolis Barrel & Bag Co., 217 Mo. App. 76, 273
S.W. 204 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925).
24. Schoenberg v. Loker, 88 Mo. App. 387 (St. L. Ct. App. 1901).
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It is certain that the word "warrant" need not be used, nor any
other of precisely the same meaning. It is enough if the words
actually used import an undertaking on the part of the owner
that the chattel is what it is represented to be, or an equivalent
25
to such undertaking.
The UCC section goes on to provide that the seller need not have a
specific intention to make a warranty. This, too, is consistent with prior
Missouri law, 26 which has considered the words actually used from the
27
standpoint of the buyer.
F. Reliance by Buyer
Need the buyer rely upon affirmations or promises by the seller for
an express warranty to be created? Both under the Uniform Sales Act 25
and under prior Missouri law, it is clear that reliance is necessary. Thus
in the leading case of Turner v. CentralHardware Co., the Missouri Supreme
Court said:
[Rieliance by the purchaser upon the affirmation is one of the
requisites of a cause of action for breach of warranty and one of
the plaintiff's burdens is the proof of that element.29
Moreover, such reliance must be justifiable; therefore where a farmer
who was a part-time implement dealer made affirmations concerning a
corn-planter to a neighboring farmer who purchased the machine, it
was held that no express warranty was created because the buyer and
seller were on the same footing, and the buyer could not justifiably
rely upon the seller's statements.30
The Uniform Commercial Code abandons the requirement of reliance, emphasizing instead whether the affirmation or promise becomes
part of the basis of the bargain. Comment 3 to UCC Section 400.2-313
states:
In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller about
the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description
of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements
25. Carter v. Black, 46 Mo. 384, 385 (1870). See also Turner v. Central
Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d 603 (1945).
26. Charles F. Curry & Co. v. Hedrick, 378 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1964).
27. Turner v. Central Hardware Co., supra note 25.
28. § 12.
29. 353 Mo. 1182, 1191, 186 S.W.2d 603, 608 (1945).
30. Dotson v. International Harvester Co., 285 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1955).
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need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such affirmations, once
made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof. The
issue normally is one of fact.
It may validly be inquired, therefore, whether the UCC has actually
rejected the reliance requirement, or whether it has not merely clothed it
in new garments-the test of "basis of the bargain." That the latter
is the case may be seen by examining another area of traditional Missouri warranty law, the principle that where the buyer inspects the
goods and buys upon his own judgment rather than upon the seller's
affirmations, no express warranty will arise. 1 The reason given for the
rule, of course, has been that the buyer did not rely upon the seller's
statements; translated into UCC language, the seller's statements did
not become a part of the basis of the bargain. On the other hand, where
the buyer inspects the goods but does not buy upon his own judgment,
instead insisting upon an assurance by the seller as a cautionary measure,
to protect against possible mistake, 32 such statement becomes an express
warranty because it is made a part of the basis of the bargain.

G. Seller's Opinion and Value of Goods
Section 400.2-312(2) provides that "an affirmation merely of the value
of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion
or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty." In short,
"dealer's talk" or "puffing" does not amount to an express warranty. In
a given case, of course, whether an affirmation is mere opinion, or whether
it creates a warranty, is a question of fact to be ascertained from all
the circumstances.
The rule of this section has long been recognized in Missouri. Thus
where a tire dealer stated that certain tires were "better tires" than those
31. This principle is recognized in Oak Lawn Sugar Co. v. Sparks Bros. Mule
Co., 159 Mo. App. 496, 141 S.W. 698 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911); Doyle v. Parrish,
110 Mo. App. 470, 85 S.W. 646 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
32. J. A. Tobin Constr. Co. v. Davis, 81 S.W.2d 474 (K.C. Mo. App. 1935);
Woods v. Thompson, 114 Mo. App. 38, 88 S.W. 1126 (K.C. Ct. App. 1905).
Other decisions fall somewhere between these two positions. Thus in Branson v.
Turner, 77 Mo. 489 (1883), where one of a yoke of oxen had a sore upon its neck,
which was obvious to the buyer, the seller's statement that "that don't hurt him;
it is most well" was held to constitute an express warranty. On the other hand, in
Moore v. Day Rubber Co., 137 Mo. App. 679, 119 S.W. 454 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909),
where the buyer knew he was purchasing second-class belting, he was not allowed
to treat as an express warranty the seller's statement that the belting was "as
good as any."
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of a competitor which warranted its tires for 12,000 miles, the statement
was held to be mere "puffing" and not to amount to a warranty that
the dealer's tires would last for more than 12,000 miles.3 3 On the other
hand, where a seller's agent told buyers that he was selling "good pipe,"
and that it was "merchantable" and "better than they were getting" from
another manufacturer, it was held that the statements amounted to a
warranty as to the quality of the pipe. 8 ' The effect of the seller's statements,
then, must be determined by examining the context in which the statements
were made.
II.

WARRANTY OF TITLE:

400.2-312

The warranty of title in the sale of goods has long been recognized
in Missouri. In 1855 the Missouri Supreme Court laid down the general
rule which has been followed down to the present day: "Where the vendor
is in possession of personal property, and sells it for full value, the law
implies a warranty of title."'' r
Section 400.2-312(1) of the UCC as adopted in Missouri imposes upon
a sale transaction a warranty by the seller that "the title conveyed shall
be good and its transfer rightful," and that the goods shall be delivered
free from any encumbrance, lien or security interest of which the buyer
is ignorant. This warranty of title, unless excluded, applies to every
sale transaction, whether involving a merchant dealing in goods of the kind,
or a casual seller.
Although the warranty of title arises by operation of law, and cannot
be described as an "express" warranty, it should be noted that the UCC
does not describe it as "implied," leaving that term for warranties of
merchantability and fitness.86 Accordingly, sections relating to exclusion

33. Callaway & Perkins v. Collier, 246 S.W. 966 (K.C. Mo. App. 1923). See
also Belt Seed Co. v. Mitchelhill Seed Co., 236 Mo. App. 142, 153 S.W.2d 106
(K.C. Ct. App. 1941).
34. Murphy v. Gay, 37 Mo. 535 (1866). See also Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe
Co. v. McDonald, 138 Mo. App. 328, 122 S.W. 5 (Spr. Ct. App. 1909).
35. Robinson v. Rice, 20 Mo. 229, 235 (1855). This decision has been followed in Dryden v. Kellogg, 2 Mo. App. 87 (St. L. Ct. App. 1876); Ranney v.
Meisenheimer, 61 Mo. App. 434 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895); Roark v. Pullam, 207 Mo.
App. 425, 229 S.W. 235 (Spr. Ct. App. 1921); Schaefer v. Fulton Iron Works Co.,
158 S.W.2d 452 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942); Ivester v. E. B. Jones Motor Co., 311
S.W.2d 109 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960). The Sca efer opinion used the term "fair price"
rather than "full price," and the Ivester opinion did not mention the requirement
of price, although clearly a fair price had been paid
36. The Missouri decisions have called this an implied warranty of title.
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or limitation of implied warranties do not apply to the warranty of title. 7
Instead, section 400.2-312(2) provides that the warranty of title may be
excluded or modified only by specific language or by circumstances giving
the buyer reason to know that the seller is not guaranteeing title in himself or is selling only such right as he or a third person may have. Circumstances of this nature are present where, for example, goods are being
sold by a sheriff or an administrator.
An early Missouri case, Ranney v. Meisenmheimer,3 8 aptly illustrates
this point. There Ranney, who had unknowingly purchased a mortgaged
yoke of oxen, sold them to Keith. Keith died and his administrator sold
the oxen to Meisenheimer, who resold them to Ranney. At this point they
were claimed by the mortgagee, and Ranney brought suit against Meisenheimer for breach of the warranty of title. Meisenheimer defended on the
basis of Ranney's prior ownership, and upon Ranney's warranty of title
in the sale to Keith. The court held this to be unavailing, both because
of the lack of privity and because Meisenheimer, purchasing at an administrator's sale, received no -warranty of title.
The Missouri decisions have indicated that the warranty of title
arises only when the seller is in possession of the goods, although no
case seems to have arisen where the warranty was denied because the
seller was not in possession. The Code imposes no such requirement of
possession; section 400.2-312 is applicable without regard to whether
the goods are in the seller's possession, " and the warranty would exist,
so it would seem, even if the goods were not yet in being.
Finally, it appears that knowledge by the buyer that the seller does
not in fact have a clear title may impair the warranty of title given
under 400.2-312(1). However, the seller may also expressly warrant the
title, and in such case the Missouri courts have held that knowledge of
the buyer of imperfections in the title does not defeat the warranty. 0
Presumably the law has not been changed in this respect by the UCC.
III. WARRANTY AGAINST INFRINGEMENT

Section 400.2-312(3)

creates a warranty against "infringement or

the like" arising out of the sale of goods by a merchant regularly dealing
37.
(1962).
38.

§ 400.2-316, RSMo 1963 Supp. See also Comment 6 to UCC § 2-312
61 Mo.App. 434 (St. L. Ct. App. 1895).

39. Comment 1 to UCC § 2-312 (1962).
40. Neville v.Hughes, 104 Mo. App. 455, 79 S.W. 735 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904).
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in goods of the kind. The warranty is meant to protect the buyer against
the claims of third persons based upon patent, trade-mark or other infringement. The warranty may be disclaimed by agreement, and does not
exist where the buyer furnishes specifications for the goods; in the latter
case, the buyer is under a duty to hold the seller harmless against claims
arising due to the seller's compliance with the specifications.
This warranty seems to be something of an innovation, and there
are no Missouri decisions which relate to such a warranty, either by the
seller or the buyer who furnishes specifications.
IV.

IMPLIED WARRANTIES-MERCHANTABILITY

AND

FiTNEss: 400.2-314, 400.2-315
The most important sales warranties, both in terms of their value
to the buyer and in terms of the amount of litigation they produce, are
the implied warranties of quality. Imposed by law upon the sales contract,
these implied warranties relate to the nature and quality of the goods,
serving to assure the buyer that the goods he purchases are not worthless,
defective or harmful.
The Uniform Commercial Code modifies in substantial degree the
Missouri law of implied warranties, broadening and clarifying the existing warranties, as well as changing to some degree the terminology used.
Missouri law relating to implied warranties long was narrowly restricted
to a very few categories including food, grain to be delivered elsewhere
or in the future, and articles purchased for a special purpose where the
buyer relied upon the seller's selection. 41 The law of implied warranties
has developed slowly from early cases involving the sale of animals and
slaves, where with the exception of warranty of title caveat emptor was
the rule; until very recently the law has retained a strong horse-trading,
buyer-beware flavor. Within. the last decade, however, the courts have decided a number of cases whose effect has been to broaden substantially
the scope of the implied warranty of quality. On the eve of the adoption
of the UCC, this warranty covered such things as processed animal food,
automobiles and other manufactured products.
The Code, consistent with prior Missouri law, recognizes two implied
warranties: merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The
41. The definitive article on implied warranties in Missouri is Overstreet,
Some Aspects of Implied Warranties in the Supreme Court of Missouri, 10 Mo.
L. REv. 147 (1945).
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coverage of these warranties, however, departs somewhat from earlier
Missouri warranties of fitness and merchantability. The warranty of merchantability under the UCC applies in all sales transactions where the
seller is a merchant in goods of the kind. This warranty has been only
incompletely recognized by the Missouri courts. The UCC warranty of
fitness, on the other hand, which has repeatedly been acknowledged in
the Missouri decisions, applies only in cases where the buyer makes
known to the seller his special needs and relies upon the seller's choice of
goods for the particular purpose. The warranty does not apply to goods
used for ordinary purposes. These warranties, together with their effect
upon existing Missouri law, are discussed below.
A. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Under section 400.2-314(1), an implied warranty of merchantability
arises in all sales in which the seller is a merchant 2 in goods of that kind,
including the serving of food or drink for value to be consumed on or
off the premises. To be merchantable, section 400.2-314(2) provides that
goods must at least be such as:
a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used;
and
d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all
units involved; and
e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
43
Moreover, under section 400.2-314(3), course of dealing or usage of trade
may give rise to additional implied warranties.
The Official Comments to the section make clear that the coverage

42. "Merchant" is defined in § 400.2-104, RSMo 1963 Supp.
43. These terms are defined in § 400.2-105, RSMo 1963 Supp.
44. Compare Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547, 549
(Mo. 1959), where it was alleged that a trade usage existed "whereby manufacturers of prepared fish foods marketed only 'complete' fish foods."
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of the warranty of merchantability is relative, depending upon the nature
of the goods themselves and the particular standards of quality which
may exist in a given line of trade.45 For example, in the sale of secondhand goods by such a merchant, a warranty of merchantability will exist;
however, its content will only include obligations "appropriate to such
goods."4 6
The warranty obligation extends to all sellers who are merchants in
the particular kind of goods sold, and includes merchants who do not
manufacture or otherwise produce the goods, but acting as wholesalers
or retailers, serve principally as conduits in the marketing system. If a
seller is not a merchant, this particular implied warranty of merchantability does not arise. Nevertheless, if a non-merchant seller "guarantees"
the goods, the obligations of the warranty of merchantability may serve
as a "guide to the content of the resulting express warranty.

'47

In Missouri, there has long been confusion and uncertainty as to
the content and even the existence of the implied warranty of merchantability. The earliest cases dealt with the sale of animals, and held that

no warranties of quality or soundness would be implied. Thus in Lindsay
v. Davis,48 decided in 1860, Judge Napton said for the court:
There must be a warranty or fraud to hold the vendor of a horse

with a secret malady responsible to the purchaser. The maxim that
a sound price implies a sound commodity, although a favorite one
in the civil law, and occasionally borrowed to settle questions
under our system, has never met with general favor, or taken root
as a permanent part of the common law. Our law is, that the buyer
takes the risk of quality and condition, unless he protects himself
by a warranty, or there has been a false representation fraudulently
4
made by the vendor. 1
This view of the sale of animals continued to be expressed well into the
present century, and formed the basis of the 1926 decision in Barton v.
Dowis," where hogs sold for breeding purposes were afflicted with cholera,
45. Comment 2 to UCC § 2-314 (1962).
46. Comment 3 to UCC § 2-314 (1962).
47. Comment 4 to UCC § 2-314 (1962).
48. 30 Mo. 406 (1860).
49. Id. at 409-10. See also Matlock v. Meyers, 64 Mo. 531 (1877).
50. 315 Mo. 226, 285 S.W. 988 (1926). See also Shank v. Lesich, 296 S.W.
224 (Spr. Mo. App. 1927), and Wells v. Welch, 205 Mo. App. 136, 224 S.W. 120
(Spr. Mo. App. 1920), setting forth the general rule, but holding further that if
the seller knew of the diseased condition of the animals, the buyer might have a
cause of action for fraud.
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which infected other hogs owned by the buyer, and it was held that the
buyer could not recover in the absence of an express warranty. 51
With regard to food for human consumption, on the other hand, an
implied warranty of merchantability was recognized at an early date,
although in many cases the language of "fit for the use intended" was
used to describe the warranty." It was held that this implied warranty of
wholesomeness applied also to food served in restaurants" and cafeterias. 54
Similarly, in the courts of appeals, an implied warranty of merchantability was held to arise in cases involving the sale of grain to be delivered
at some future date, or to be delivered to the buyer over a substantial
distance. Thus where a buyer at Shreveport, Louisiana, ordered a car
load of corn from sellers in Kansas City, and the corn arrived wet and
rotten, the sellers were held to have breached an implied warranty that
the corn would be merchantable when delivered. 55 The principle was also
56
held applicable to the sale of ice by a manufacturer to a dealer.
In at least one case, the courts of appeals extended the warranty of
merchantability to manufactured goods. It was held in J. B. Colt Co. v.
Preslar57 that in the sale of a light plant an implied warranty arose that
it would give reasonable service. Other decisions apparently reached
essentially the same result through extending the warranty of fitness to
include particular or specific uses by the buyer which in fact were quite
ordinary.5 1

51. The court held that although the hogs were sold for breeding, a special
purpose, which gave rise to an implied warranty of fitness, the warranty of fitness
for breeding did not extend to any disease which the hogs might have had, so
long as the disease did not interfere with their breeding capabilities.
52. St. Louis Brewing Ass'n v. McEnroe, 80 Mo. App. 429, 431 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1899). See also Beyer v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 75 S.W.2d 642 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1934); Fantroy v. Schirmer, 296 S.W. 235 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927); Crocker
Wholesale Grocer Co. v. Evans, 272 S.W. 1017 (Spr. Mo. App. 1925).
53. Smith v. Carlos, 215 Mo. App. 488, 247 S.W. 468 (Spr. Ct. App. 1923).
54. Stewart v. Martin, 353 Mo. 1, 181 S.W.2d 657 (1941).
55. Atkins Bros. v. Landa, 119 Mo. App. 119, 95 S.W. 949 (K.C. Ct. App.
1906). See also Yontz v. McVean, 202 Mo. App. 377, 383, 217 S.W. 1000, 1002 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1920), where the court said that it was "implied that the corn should
be merchantable; that is, of good quality and salable, though not necessarily the
best."
56. St. Louis Union Packing Co. v. Mertens, 150 Mo. App. 583, 131 S.W.
354 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910).
57. 274 S.W. 1100 (Spr. Mo. App. 1925).
58. See, e.g., London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Strait Scale Co., 322 Mo. 502, 15
S.W.2d 766 (1929); Dubinsky v. Lindburg Cadillac Co., 250 S.W.2d 830 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1952); Columbia Weighing Mach. Co. v. Young, 222 Mo. App. 144, 4
S.W.2d 828 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928).
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In 1944 the Missouri Supreme Court utterly demolished the implied
warranty of merchantability in the landmark decision in State ex rel.
Jones Store Co. v. Shain.59 There the purchaser of a blouse had allegedly
contracted a dermatitis from the blouse, and brought action for breach
of implied warranty against the seller. The Kansas City Court of Appeals
affirmed a judgment for the buyer, stating that the implied warranties
applicable to food and grain should also apply to clothing;60 one judge
dissented, and the case was transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court quashed the opinion of the Kansas City Court of
Appeals, referring to the earlier cases relating to the sale of animals, and
holding that the general rule of caveat emptor applies to the sale of
personal property. The sole implied warranty available to the buyer was
that of fitness, but because the blouse was purchased only for the ordinary
purpose of wear, and not for any special purpose, the sale gave rise to
no warranty of fitness."'
Following the Jones Store Co. decision, it was held in Zesclk v. Abrasive
6
Co. of Ptiladeplhia
that no implied warranty of quality attached to the
sale of a cutting wheel, where the wheel was not furnished for a "particular
special purpose." The United States district court read the two cases as
holding that the only implied sales warranty was one of fitness, and
said, "the doctrine of implied warranty of merchantability is not an
axiom likely to be sustained by the Supreme Court of Missouri.163 And in
the 1952 St. Louis Court of Appeals case of Worley v. Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co.64 the court relied upon a theory of misrepresentation rather
than warranty to sustain a cause of action in a products liability case.
Within the last decade, however, there has been a resurrection of

59. 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (En Banc 1944).
60. Marra v. Jones Store Co., 170 S.W.2d 441 (K.C. Mo. App. 1943).
61. Professor Lee-Carl Overstreet responded to the Jones Store Co. case with
a searching law review article which illustrated in a definitive manner the extent
to which the Missouri Supreme Court had departed from sound legal thinking

in that case. Overstreet, Some Aspects of Implied Warrantiesin the Supreme Court
of Missouri, 10 Mo. L. REv. 147 (1945).

62. 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W.2d 140 (1944).
63. McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 708, 713
(W.D. Mo. 1949). "The gist of the -ruling made by the Court in the here referred
to cases is that absent the factors stated, the axiom of caveat emptor is the doctrine
to be applied to contracts of sale in Missouri." Id. at 712. See also Ross v. Philip
Morris Co. 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
64. 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952). The court
also fell back upon express warranty, finding an affirmation of fact in a statement
upon the package that "Tide is kind to your hands."
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the implied warranty of merchantability by the Missouri courts. In Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co.,65 decided in 1959, the Missouri
Supreme Court held that there is an implied warranty of merchantable
quality in the sale of processed animal food, although the opinion also
denominated this a "warranty of fitness." The following year, the Springfield Court of Appeals expressly rejected the holding of the Jones Store Co.
case, and held that in the sale of an automobile there is an implied
warranty "that it be reasonably fit for use intended," even where this
was an ordinary use.66
Finally, in Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp.,67 the Missouri Supreme
Court in 1963 held that an implied warranty of quality attached to the
sale of a gas cooking stove. Although the opinion dealt primarily with
the question of privity of contract, the cause of action was based upon
an implied warranty of merchantability, and in holding the manufacturer
liable to the ultimate consumer there is no question but that the court
swept away the restrictive holdings in the Jones Store Co. and Zesch cases. 68
The Uniform Comimercial Code, through its explicit provisions relating to the implied warranty of merchantability, will finally lay to rest
whatever ghosts of the Jones Store Co. case may still be abroad in the
jurisprudence of this state. By its careful delineation between the implied
warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty of fitness, the
Code will serve to clarify legal thinking and to insure harmonious and
sensible results in future warranty cases.
B. Imiplied Warranty of Fitness
Section 400.2-315 sets forth the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. It provides that where the buyer gives the seller
reason to know a particular purpose for which the goods are to be used,
and that the buyer is relying upon the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish such goods, an implied warranty will arise that the
65. 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959). See also Albers Milling Co. v. Carney, 341
S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1960) ('processed turkey feed); Borman v. O'Donley, 364 S.W2d
31 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962) (silage).
66. Mullins v. Sam Scism Motors, Inc., 331 S.W.2d 185, 195 (Spr. Mo. App.
1960). See also Miller v. Andy Burger Motors, Inc. 370 S.W.2d 654 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1963). Cf. Mitchell v. Rudasill, 332 S.W2d 91 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960) (sale

of cow).

67. 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
68. See Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964), for an early
reaction to the Morrow case by the federal courts.
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goods are fit for such purpose. The Official Comment makes clear that
the buyer's particular purpose must differ from the ordinary purpose for
which such goods are used; it must be special or peculiar to the buyer's
business or other needs. If the purpose is only an ordinary one the
warranty of merchantability will apply.6 The warranty of fitness applies
to any seller whose skill or judgment is relied upon by the buyer in this
fashion, and may therefore be imposed upon non-merchants as well as
merchants.7 0
As specified in the Code -the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is imposed where the buyer makes known his special needs
and the seller supplies goods to meet those needs. In this respect, the
warranty of fitness resembles to some degree an express warranty; and
indeed in a given case it might be hard to determine whether the conduct
of the parties has created an express warranty or an implied warranty of
fitness. For example, where the buyer tells the seller that he wants a
corn planter that will "plant this corn nine inches apart, that we could
use at high speed, and that would put the fertilizer down in the same
operation," and the seller says that "this planter will be especially suitable
for your use," is the resulting warranty express, or an implied one of
71
fitness?
Numerous Missouri judicial decisions have recognized the warranty of
fitness for a particular use. Thus, as early as 1890, a case came before
the Kansas City Court of Appeals involving the sale of tin foil, which
the seller knew was intended by the buyer to be used for wrapping plug
tobacco; the foil delivered turned out to be bottlers' foil, and worthless for
the buyer's purpose.72 The court said:
The principle is elemental that, when a dealer contracts to
supply an article in which he deals, to be applied to a particular
purpose so that the buyer necessarily trusts to the judgment of
the dealer, there is, in that case, an implied term of warranty, that
it shall be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it is to be applied.

69. Comment 2 to UCC § 2-315 (1926).
70. Comment 4 to UCC § 2-315 (1962).
71. In Dotson v. International Harvester Co., 285 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1955),
the court assumed that a warranty of fitness resulted.
"72. Armstrong, Gilbert & Co. v. The Johnson Tobacco Co., 41 Mo. App. 254
(K.C. Ct. App. 1890). Perhaps the earliest recognition of this warranty of fitness
by a Missouri appellate judge came in Judge Napton's dissenting opinion in Ferguson v. Huston, 6 Mo. 407 (1840).
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In such case the buyer trusts to the dealer and relies upon his
judgment.73

Other Missouri courts of appeals decisions followed, involving such things
as a ventilating fan to be used in connection with sand blasting,74 and
lumber to be used for building a boat. 5 In 1924 the Missouri Supreme
Court found an implied warranty of fitness in the sale of a tractor, 0 and
two years later in the sale of a scaffolding designed to meet the special
77
needs of the buyer.
Perhaps because the existence of any other implied warranty of
quality was doubtful at best, the Missouri courts often applied the warranty of fitness to cases where the contemplated use of the goods was only
ordinary. In short, to avoid the harsh result of caveat emptor, the courts
were willing to extend the warranty of fitness to protect buyers where
goods proved defective. Thus where a cast iron beam on a scale broke
the first time it was used, the Missouri Supreme Court was quick to
find that the scale had been sold for a particular purpose, and therefore
imposed an implied warranty of fitness?8 This liberal approach was flatly
rejected in 1944 by the supreme court in State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v.
Sluin,7 where the sale of a blouse was held not to be for a particular
purpose, and consequently no implied warranty of fitness attached. Under
the UCC, of course, the warranty of merchantability extends to all ordinary uses such as this, and the buyer will be protected.
Finally, in the application of the implied warranty of fitness, it is
amply clear that the buyer must actually rely upon the seller's skill or
judgment in furnishing goods for the buyer's special purpose.80 This
element has been recognized by the Missouri courts on several occasions.
73. 41 Mo. App. at 258.

74. Skinner v. Kerwin Ornamental Glass Co., 103 Mo. App. 650, 77 S.W.
1011 (St. L. Ct. App. 1903).

75. Antrim Lumber Co. v. Daly, 190 S.W. 971 (K.C. Mo. App. 1916).

76. Hunter v. Waterloo Gasoline Engine Co., 260 S.W. 970 (Mo. 1924).

77. Busch & Latta Painting Co. v. Woermann Constr. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276
S.W. 614 (1925).
78. London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Strait Scale Co., 322 Mo. 502, 15 S.W.2d
766 (1929). See also Columbia Weighing Mach. Co. v. Young, 222 Mo. App. 144,
4 S.W.2d 828 (K.C. App. 1928).

79. 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (En Banc 1944). The Jones Store Co. case,

however, was not faithfully followed by the courts of appeals. See Dubinsky v.
Lindburg Cadillac Co., 250 S.W.2d 830, 832 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952): "In the sale
of an automobile there is an implied warranty that it is reasonably fit for the use

intended."
80. Comment 1 to UCC § 2-315 (1962).
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Thus, where the buyer desired to purchase frozen food cartons in which
to package chili, and informed the seller thereof, but conducted its own
tests of the suitability of sample cartons furnished by the seller, the
warranty of fitness was held inapplicable. 8 ' The buyer plainly had not
relied upon the seller's skill, but upon its own.
V. PRIvIr

OF CONTRACT

In the last half-century, perhaps the most striking judicial development in relation to sales warranties has been the extension of warranty
protection to persons not in contractual privity with the seller of the
goods. The attack upon the requirement of privity has come along two
lines: (1) extension of implied warranty liability to the retail buyer to
include, in addition to the retailer with whom there is contractual privity,
the wholesaler and manufacturer of the goods; and (2) extension of pro-

tection from the buyer himself to members of his family and guests in
his household, who may be harmed by defective goods. Moreover, there
has been a tendency to enlarge the protection of warranty without contractual privity to an ever-increasing variety of products, beginning with
food and drugs for human consumption, and expanding to include products which if defective are inherently dangerous to consumers, and ultimately to non-dangerous products.
This broadening of warranty protection amounts, in essence, to the
imposition of strict liability upon manufacturers for harmful effects from
defective goods. Therefore, whether it remains a matter of contract law
is at least debatable. Some courts have recognized that the abandonment
of contractual privity is equivalent to strict liability,8 2 and the American
Law Institute, in drafting tentative sections for the Restatement of Torts,
Second, has included strict liability of the manufacturer to the ultimate
consumer.8 3
In Missouri, the gradual abandonment of contractual privity as a
81. Interstate Folding Box Co. v. Hodge Chile Co., 334 S.W.2d 408 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1960). See also Dotson v. International Harvester Co., 285 S.W.2d 585
(Mo. 1955); Davies v. Motor Radio Co., 236 S.W.2d 409 (K.C. Mo. App. 1951).
82. See, e.g., Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41, 51 (Mo. En
Banc 1963): "The precise question . . . is whether privity of contract is necessary
in order for an ultimate consumer to recover from a manufacturer on an implied
warranty or, perhaps stated more frankly, whether a manufacturer of an instrumentality which is imminently da'ngerous if defectively manufactured is to be
held to strict liability upon -proof of the defect and of causation."
83. RESTATEMENT (SEcotN), TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
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prerequisite to warranty recovery has roughly followed the pattern in
other jurisdictions. Thus, prior to the turn of the century, and well into
this century, the courts laid down that sales warranties "are available
'4
The first Missouri decision to
only between parties to the contract."1
breach the privity bulwark was Madoiros v. Kamsas City Coca-Cola
Bottling Co.,8 5 a mouse-in-a-bottle case which came before the Kansas
City Court of Appeals in 1936, and which prompted the court to say that
If privity of contract is required, then, under the situation and
circumstance of modern merchandise in such matters, privity of
contract exists in the consciousness and understanding of all rightthinking persons.,
The Madouros case, based upon the "sealed package" doctrine holding
the manufacturer liable without privity if he packages his goods in sealed
containers only to be opened by the consumer, was followed by several
other courts of appeals decisions involving soft drinks, 7 buttermilk,8 and
packaged bread.89 Where, however, salmon was packed in a sealed can
by the manufacturer, it was held that the consumer could not recover
against the wholesaler for breach of implied warranty.90
The Missouri Supreme Court decision in State ex rel. Jones Store Co.
v. Shain,9 ' in 1944, caused great uncertainty as to the law of warranty
in Missouri, and cast a shadow upon the earlier courts of appeals decisions
relating to privity. Thus, the federal district courts in Missouri consistently
held that, under the law of Missouri, privity of contract was necessary
92
to any warranty action.
84. Ranney v. Meisenheimer, 61 Mo. App. 434, 439 (St. L. App. 1895);
Crocker v. Barron, 234 S.W. 1032, 1033 (St. L. Mo. App. 1921).
85. 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936).
86. Id. at 283, 90 S.W.2d at 450.
87. Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d 53 (St. L. Mo. App.
1955); Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314 (St. L. Mo. App. 1948).
Cf. Nemela v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 104 S.W.2d 773 (St. L. Mo. App. 1937).
88. Carter v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 139 S.W.2d 1025 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940).
89. Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942);
McNicholas v. Continental Baking Co., 112 S.W.2d 849 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938).
90. DeGouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d
336 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936). On the subject of wholesalers' liability, see Comment,
1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 380.
91. Discussed in text at note 59 supra.
92. The leading case is McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949), where a two-year-old plaintiff injured by an
exploding bottle in his home was held to have no cause of action for breach of
implied warranty -because of the lack of contractual privity. See also Ross v.
Phillip Morris Co., 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Dennis v. Willys-Overland
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The next important development came in 1952, when the St. Louis
Court of Appeals, apparently with full awareness of the implications of
the Jones Store Co. opinion, held that a consumer had a cause of action
for dermatitis against the manufacturer of Tide, where "Tide is kind to your
hands" appeared on the box. 3 Noting that warranty originally was a
tort theory, "in the nature of an action on the case for deceit,]" 4 the
court held that liability in the action before it sprang not from contract
but from the manufacturer's representations to the consumer. Thereafter,
in 1959, the Missouri Supreme Court cited with approval the food cases
rejecting privity,95 while in the same year the St. Louis Court of Appeals
refused to abandon the privity requirement in an implied warranty
action against an automobile manufacturer involving only a claim for
money damages because of defects in the vehicle, where no personal injuries were involved. 96
Finally, in 1963 in the landmark case of Morrow v. Caloric Appliance
Corp.,97 the Missouri Supreme Court at last considered the privity problem and held that a consumer who purchased a gas stove which proved
defective and caused a fire which destroyed his house had a cause of
action for breach of implied warranty against the manufacturer. The court
stated that the imminently dangerous nature of the defective stove impelled
the abandonment of the warranty requirement in favor of the consumer.
The Uniform Commercial Code does not attempt any definitive res-

olution of the privity of contract problem, but leaves the matter to the
decidedly non-uniform development of the common law in the various
states. The UCC restricts its treatment of the subject to a relatively
small area. Section 400.2-318 provides that warranties by a seller extend
not only to the buyer, but also to members of the buyer's household and
guests therein "if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,

Motors, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Wessley v. Seiberling Rubber Co.,
90 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
93. Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d
532 (St. L. Ct. App. 1952).
94. Id. at 1120, 253 S.W.2d at 536.
95. Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
See also Anderson, Observations on the Law of Implied Warranty of Quality in
Missouri: 1960, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 71.
96. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 327 S.W.2d 535 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959). See
also Comment, 27 Mo. L. REv. 194 (1962).
97. 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En Banc 1963); 29 Mo. L. REv. 217 (1964).
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consume or be affected by the goods."'g This extension includes only those
"injured in person" by the breach. 90
It is expressly provided that this extension of warranty protection may
not be limited or excluded by the seller. However, this does not mean
that a seller may not limit or exclude warranties entirely, as he may disclaim all warranties in his dealing with the buyer, but only that he
may not prevent existing warranties from extending beyond the buyer
to his household and guests.
The Code, therefore, leaves unanswered many of the difficult questions involved in further relaxation of the privity requirement. What of
privity with regard to wholesalers and manufacturers? What about the
guest who is outside the buyer's home?100 What of the buyer's employee? 1 1
What of the third person who is unconnected with the buyer except for
his personal injuries resulting from defective goods or equipment used by
the buyer? The Official Comment to this section states that the section
is neutral as to these and other matters, not being "intended to enlarge
or restrict the developing case law.' 10 2 Therefore, Morrow v. Caloric Appliance remains the law of Missouri, and further developments in this area
must come from the Supreme Court of Missouri.
VI.

INTERPRETATION OF CONFLICTING OR

CUMULATIVE WARRANTIES:

400.2-317

Where a sale is made, the seller may make one or more express
98. This section thus abrogates the effect of such decisions as Conner v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 25 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Mo. 1939), and McIntyre v.
Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
99. Here the draftsmen of the Code have succumbed to one of the many
perils inherent in legislative drafting. Inasmuch as the warranty only extends to a
person "injured in person by breach of the warranty," it would appear that the
warranty is extended only when some person is injured, and not before the injury.
The evident purpose of the section is to limit recovery to personal injuries, but
unfortunately the language fails to accomplish this purpose. Because the warranty
extends to anyone "injured in person," it would follow that such a person has full
coverage under the warranty, for property damage as well as -personal injuries.
The anomalous result follows that a guest who suffers slight personal injuries
may recover for any property damage, but the uninjured guest has no recourse
on the warranty no matter how great his property damage. This difficulty might
have been avoided if the draftsmen had said, "The remedy for breach of such
warranty to persons other than the buyer shall be limited to damages for -personal

injuries."

100. See, e.g., Kaczmarkiewicz v. J. A. Williams Co., 13 Pa. D.&C.2d 14 (1957).
101. See, e.g., Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Co., 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964);
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
102. Comment 3 to UCC § 2-318 (1962). See also Comment 2 to UCC § 2-313
(1962).
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warranties relating to the goods. These express warranties may conflict
with implied warranties relating to the goods, or may be inconsistent
with one another. The U-niform Comwrmial Code, in section 400.2-317,
sets forth certain rules of construction to be followed in resolving these
conflicts.
The Code provides that where possible, warranties both express
and implied shall be construed "as consistent with each other and as
cumulative," unless the construction is unreasonable. If consistent, cumulative interpretation is unreasonable, then the intention of the contracting
parties shall govern which warranty or warranties shall prevail. In determining the parties' intention, the section lays down that a sample will
prevail over inconsistent general language, and that technical or exact
specifications will prevail over both a sample and general language. Also,
except for the implied warranty of fitness, express warranties will prevail
over inconsistent implied warranties; the exception is in recognition of
the quasi-express nature of the warranty of fitness, depending as it
does upon the buyer's reliance on the seller's choice of goods for a particular
purpose.
The Missouri courts have long held that an express warranty excludes an implied warranty on the same subject. 03 However, where the
express warranty is narrower than the implied warranty, the buyer may
base his claim upon that part of the implied warranty not covered by
the express warranty.' 0 '
It is only when the contract shows on its face that it is exclusive
and contains all the obligations attaching to the seller or when an
implied warranty is covered by or is inconsistent with an express
provision of the contract that all implied warranties are merged in
or superceded [sic] by the express provisions of the contract.,0
By and large, in interpreting conflicting warranties, the Missouri
courts have sought to reach reasonable results. This policy will not be
modified by the adoption of the UCC. Thus in the 1960 case of Mitchell
103. See, e.g., Hunt v. Sanders, 313 Mo. 169, 180, 281 S.W. 422, 425 (1926):
"The express warranty as to the particulars included within its terms excludes an
implied warranty." See also Mullins v. Sam Scism Motors, Inc., 331 S.W.2d 185
(Spr. Mo. App. 1960); Advance Rumley Thresher Co. v. Briggs Hdwe. Co., 202
Mo. App. 603, 206 S.W. 587 (Spr. Ct. App. 1918).
104. National Cash Register Co. v. Van Duser Supply Co., 207 Mo. App.
454, 232 S.W. 1091 (Spr. Ct. App. 1921).
105. Id. at 462, 232 S.W. at 1093.
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06 the seller of milk cows stated, "I will guarantee
v. R udasilt,1
their bags
to be sound and give a decent flow of milk." The buyer sued for breach
of warranty because the cows were diseased with mastitis. The case went
to the jury on a theory of implied warranty of fitness, and the seller on
appeal claimed this to have been in error, because the express warranty
excluded any implied warranty. The St. Louis Court of Appeals stated:

A more accurate statement of the correct rule is that an express warranty excludes an implied warranty of fitness (1) if the
express warranty is inconsistent with the warranty which would
have been implied had none been expressed; or (2) if the express
warranty relates to the same or a similar subject matter as one
7
which would have been implied.10
Here, the implied warranty was exactly the same as the express warranty,
and therefore, said the court, any error in the case was nonprejudicial.

VII.

DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES:

400.2-316

Under the UCC, as under prior Missouri law, it is possible for the
seller of goods to disclaim all warranties to the buyer, or to give certain
warranties and to disclaim others. Basically, the problem here is twofold;
the seller's language of disclaimer must not conflict with other language
creating a warranty, and the seller must use language of disclaimer which
imparts to the buyer an understanding that certain warranties are being
excluded.
The first problem deals principally with express warranties. Will the
seller be allowed to sell a horse and then, after specifically disclaiming all
warranties, deliver a cow? 0 s Section 400.2-316(1) lays down guidelines
for the resolution of conflicts between express warranties and disclaimers.
It provides that where it is reasonable to do so, language disclaiming
warranties must be construed consistently with words or conduct tending
to create an express warranty. To the extent that this construction would
be unreasonable, the limitation or exclusion of the warranty will not be
given effect.
106. 332 S.W.2d 91 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
107. Id. at 95.
108. Under the UCC, this appears to be a warranty problem. Prior reasoning,
on the other hand, in which warranties were described as "collateral contracts in
cident to a contract to sell," held that under these circumstances the horse was
the subject-matter of the sale contract, or was basic or central to the agreement,
and therefore the delivery of a cow would not be a breach of warranty, but a violation of the fundamental sale contract.
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Two other Code sections are also applicable to this problem. Section
400.2-302 permits the court to refuse to enforce any contract term which
it finds to be "unconscionable," and therefore if in a given situation
enforcement of a warranty disclaimer were found to violate the conscience
of the court, the court might refuse to give effect to it. This would apply,
of course, to unconscionable disclaimers of either express or implied warranties. Further, under section 400.2-202 the parol evidence rule may be
invoked to exclude any express warranties not appearing in a writing
intended by the parties as a final and complete statement of their agreement. Therefore, by fully integrating the sale contract in a written document, the seller may exclude any prior oral or written promises or affirmations which would otherwise amount to express warranties.
The Code treatment of conflicts beaween express warranties and
disclaimers will doubtless clarify the Missouri law upon this subject. The
confused state of prior judicial decisions is aptly illustrated by Belt Seed
Co. v. Mitchelhill Seed Co.,109 where the seller offered to sell bluegrass
seed of 77% purity and 80% germination. The buyer ordered 300 bags,
and the seller returned a printed confirmation of sale stating that the
company "gives no warranty, express or implied, as to description, quantity, productiveness, or any other matter of any seeds we send out and
we will not be in any way responsible for crop." When received by the
buyer, the seed did not test 80% germination, and buyer brought action
for breach of warranty. The seller defended on the basis of the disclaimer.
The appellate court, after referring to several canons of interpretation,
finally pointed out that the buyer's position was weakened because the
word "warranty" or its equivalent had not been used in connection with
the statement as to 80%o germination. The court concluded:
We are of the opinion that, under all of the circumstances, the
statement by defendant that the seed would germinate 80 per cent
was merely the expression of an opinion."1°
Where the seller seeks to disclaim implied warranties of merchantability or fitness, language must be used which will clearly communicate
such disclaimer to the buyer. Section 400.2-316(2), (3) sets certain standards for the disclaimer of these implied warranties. The broad test is
that the language of the disclaimer must be such that it "in common
109. 236 Mo. App. 142, 153 S.W.2d 106 (K.C. Ct. App. 1941).
110. Id. at 153, 153 S.W.2d at 111.
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understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties
and makes plain that there is not implied warranty." Such expressions as
"with all faults," or "as is," are sufficient to exclude all implied warranties.
More specifically, and subject to the above standard, section 400.2316(2) sets forth what may be considered the "recommended" manner of
disclaiming the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. To
exclude the implied warranty of merchantability, the language used must
mention merchantability, and if the disclaimer is in writing it must be
conspicuous. 11 The implied warranty of fitness may only be excluded
by a conspicuous writing; the Code suggests this language: "There are no
warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
Further, under section 400.2-316(3)(b), where before entering into
the sale contract the buyer examines the goods or after demand by the
seller refuses to do so, the implied warranties will not extend to defects
such examination should have revealed. 112 And section 400.2-316(3)(c)
provides that course of dealing" s or performance," 4 or usage of trade,
may further limit or exclude implied warranties. Such custom must, of
course, be known to the buyer, or at least the buyer must be chargeable
with knowledge thereof.
The UCC should bring about, at the very least, a reexamination of
the disclaimer clauses used by sellers to exclude implied warranties. On
the other hand, no radical change has been brought about in Missouri
law relating to such disclaimers. Numerous decisions have dealt with
warranty disclaimers, and it has repeatedly been held that "an express
contractual disclaimer of any warranty other than those specifically provided
in the written contract precludes proof of, or reliance upon, an implied
warranty of fitness.""' 5 By and large, these decisions have sought to reach
reasonable and just results. Thus in a case involving the purchase of a
used threshing machine engine, the order blank contained an express
warranty, but stated that the warranty "does not apply to secondhand
machinery." The court held that inasmuch as the express warranty did
111. § 400.1-201(10), RSMo 1963 Supp., defines "conspicuous."
112. Moore v. Miller, 100 S.W.2d 331 (K.C. Mo. App. 1936), is in accord.
113. "Course of dealing" and "usage of trade" are defined in § 400.1-205, RSMo
1963 Supp.
114. § 400.2-208, RSMo 1963 Supp.
115. Hargrove v. Lewis, 313 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958), and cases
cited therein. See also B. H. Tureen Hotels, Inc. v. Nachman & Co., 317 S.W.2d
422 (Mo. 1958).
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not apply, and there was no express disclaimer of other warranties, the
normal implied warranties were applicable." 6
Fihially, as indicated in the section dealing with the warranty of
title, section 400.2-316 does not apply to this warranty. The discussion of
exclusion or modification of the warranty of title appears under Part II
of this paper.

VIII.

REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY

Matters of breach of the sales contract and remedies therefor are
treated in detail elsewhere in this Symposium. Several of the UCC's innovations in this area, however, relate particularly to sales warranties and
are suitable for brief mention here.
A. Statute of Limitations
Section 400.2-725 (1) requires that actions for breach of a sale contract
be brought within four years after the cause of action has accrued.
This section applies to warranties, and represents a change from prior
Missouri law, which has provided a ten-year period in actions upon
written contracts, 117 and a five-year period as to other contracts." 8
The section further permits the contracting parties to reduce the
period of limitation to as little as one year, but not to extend it. This
is an innovation in Missouri law; hitherto section 431.030, RSMo has
declared null and void any contract limiting the time in which an action
may be brought. Under this section of the Code, some question may arise
as to the effect upon the rights of third parties of an agreement to shorten
the limitation period. Thus, where the retailer and buyer agree that
the period shall be one year, what is the effect of this limit upon the
rights of a guest in the buyer's home who is injured by the goods? Does
section 431.030 continue to set forth the policy of the state as to such
persons?
Section 400.2-725(2) makes explicit that the cause of action accrues
at the time the breach occurs, irrespective of the knowledge of the aggrieved
party, and that unless a warranty extends to future performance, its

116. The New Birdsall Co. v. Keys, 99 Mo. App. 458, 74 S.W. 12 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1903).
117. § 516.110, RSMo 1959.
118. § 516.120, RSMo 1959.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

27

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [1965], Art. 6

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

breach occurs when delivery of the goods is tendered. This provision may
conceivably leave the buyer vulnerable where the warranty of title is
concerned; assuming that the seller lacks title, the true owner of the
goods has a period of five years under section 516.120, RSMo 1959 in
which to bring his action. However, because "the warranty of quiet possession is abolished '"1o by the UCC, the warranty of title to the buyer
would seem to be breached when the goods are delivered by the seller.
Therefore, the statute would run in favor of the seller in four years from
delivery, leaving the true owner as much as an additional year thereafter
in which to bring his action against the unprotected buyer, who would
have no recourse against anyone for his loss.
B. Notice to Seller and Burden of Proof
Where the buyer discovers a breach of warranty after acceptance of
the goods, or is sued for infringement, under section 400.2-607(3) he must
notify the seller of such fact within a reasonable time, or he will "be
barred from any remedy." This does not appear to be any departure from
1 20
prior Missouri law relating to breach of warranty.
Where a breach of warranty is alleged, section 400.2-607(4) places the
burden of proof of such breach upon the buyer. This, of course, is consistent with prior Missouri law.
C. "Vouching in" Seller to Defend
It has long been recognized that, where warranty of title is concerned,
a buyer who is sued by one claiming to be the true owner of the goods
may "vouch in" the seller of the goods to defend the action, by giving
notice thereof to the seller.121 In 1958 the St. Louis Court of Appeals stated:
The general rule is that when a suit is brought by a third
person against the purchaser, the seller may intervene and defend
the title, and if he is duly notified he is bound to do so. When the
seller is notified and fails to defend, he is bound by the results of
such litigation.122
119. Comment 1 to UCC § 2-312 (1962).
120. But cf. Travers Co. v. Goldman, 255 S.W. 923 (St. L. Mo. App. 1923);
Advance Rumley Thresher Co. v. Briggs Hdwe. Co., 202 Mo. App. 603, 206 S.W.
587 (Spr. Ct. App. 1918).
121. The doctrine was recognized in Missouri over a century ago, in Johnson
v. Blanks, 34 Mo. 255 (1863).
122. Ivester v. E. B. Jones Motor Co., 311 S.W.2d 109, 111 (St. L. Mo. App.
1958). See also Schaefer v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 158 S.W.2d 452 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1942).
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Section 400.2-607(5) extends this "vouching in" rule to all warranties
or other obligations where the seller is answerable over. Thus, where
manufacturer M sells goods to retailer R, who resells them to consumer C,
and C brings action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability
against R, R may give M notice and opportunity to defend. If M does not
come in and defend, he will be bound in any subsequent action by R
"by any determination of fact common to the two litigations." Of course,
it goes without saying that if M does come in and defend he will also be
bound.12s
D. Liquidation and Limitation of Damages
Section 400.2-718(1) provides that damages for breach of a sales
contract, including breach of warranty, may be liquidated in "an amount
which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused
by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy."
Also, section 400.2-719(3) permits consequential damages to be limited
or excluded altogether by the agreement of the parties, where not unconscionable; but any limitation of consequential damages for personal
injuries from consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable. Of course,
the seller under section 400.2-316 may exclude all warranties and thereby
escape the payment of any damages.
E. Measure of Damages
In addition to the remedies of rejection'" and revocation of acceptance
of goods,1 2 5 the buyer may recover damages for breach of warranty. The

basic measure of such damages as set forth in section 400.2-714(2) is the
classic one: the difference at the time and place of acceptance between
the value of the goods as they actually were, and the value that they would
have had if they had been as warranted. Where special circumstances exist,
proximate damages of a different amount may be shown. In addition,
under section 400.2-715 incidental'2 6 and consequential damages are available to the buyer.
123. Where the claim is for infringement, and the buyer is sued, the seller may

notify the buyer that he wishes to defend the suit, and to bear the expenses thereof. If the -buyer refuses to permit the seller to control such litigation, the buyer

may not thereafter assert any remedy against the seller. § 400.2-607(5) (b), RSMo
1963 Supp.
124. § 400.2-602, RSMo 1963 Supp.

125. § 400.2-608, RSMo 1963 Supp.

126. Missouri decisions are in accord. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Fulton Iron Works
Co., 158 S.W.2d 452 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952); Shultis v. Rice, 114 Mo. App. 274,,
89 S.W. 357 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
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